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ARTICLES 
 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE 
BRADLEY CENTER 
 
MATTHEW J. PARLOW* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 5, 1985, Jane Bradley Pettit—along with her husband, Lloyd  
Pettit—announced that she was going to pay for the construction of a new 
sports arena, the Bradley Center, and donate it to the people of the State of 
Wisconsin so that they could enjoy and benefit from a state-of-the-art sports 
facility.1  The announcement was met with much enthusiasm, appreciation, 
and even marvel due to Mrs. Pettit’s incredible generosity.2  But few, if any, 
seemed to fully understand and appreciate how unique and extraordinary Mrs. 
Pettit’s gift was and would become.  This lack of awareness was due to at least 
a few contextual factors.  Up until the time of Mrs. Pettit’s announcement, the 
United States and Canada—where all of the teams in the four major profes-
sional sports leagues played3—experienced only a modest number of new 
                                                            
* Dean and Donald P. Kennedy Chair in Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of 
Law, and former Member of the Board of Directors for the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment  
Corporation.  I would like to thank Professor Janine Kim for her comments on an earlier draft of this 
article; Sarah Erdmann, Abbey Essman, Natalie Neals, AJ Peterman, and Ashley Sinclair for their  
research assistance; Tom Gartner of the Milwaukee City Attorney’s Office and Fran Croak of the 
Jane Bradley Pettit Foundation for their help on gathering research for this project; Sarah Zimmerman 
and the Bradley family for their support of my work on this article; and Marquette University Law 
School for its financial support.   
1. See Arena News Was at Center Arena, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 9, 1985, at 4B. 
2. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1224 (Wis. 1985) (thanking the Pettits 
on behalf of the city for their donation to build a new sports arena) (on file with author).  Interesting-
ly, the original construction (and thus donation) amount at the time was estimated at $30 to $40 mil-
lion.  See Sale of Bucks Began Long Debate, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 1985, pt. 1, at 12.  The 
final construction costs totaled approximately $90 million—nearly triple the original estimate.  See 
Mary Van de Kamp Nohl, Jane’s Gift, MILWAUKEE MAG., Nov. 1, 2001, at 46, 46. 
3. For purposes of this article, I define the four major professional sports leagues as Major League 
Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), 
and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
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sports facilities.4   
Conversely, after the Bradley Center opened, the subsequent decades saw an 
extraordinary construction boom of new sports arenas and stadiums.5  Since 
1988—the year that the Bradley Center opened—there have been eighty-nine 
new sports facilities built,6 and there are four additional arenas and stadiums 
currently under construction or well along in the planning stages.7   This num-
ber is somewhat remarkable given that there are only 122 teams in the four 
major sports today8—and a number of them share the same arena or stadium, 
bringing the effective number of needed facilities to 109.9   In 1985, then, per-
                                                            
4. See Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They Economically Justifia-
ble? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 483, 486 (2002) 
[hereinafter Parlow, Publicly Financed].). 
5. Id. at 485.  See Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 97−123 
(2012) [hereinafter Parlow, Equitable] (appendix detailing various information regarding sports are-
nas and stadiums used by teams in the NBA, NFL, NHL, and MLB, including the years in which each 
facility was built). 
6. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5. 
7. See Mark Anderson, Sacramento Kings Say New Downtown Arena Will Have Nation’s Best  
Wi-Fi Connectivity, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2014/07/24/sacramento-kings-downtown-arena-will-
have-
na-
tions.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+industry_7+(Ind
ustry+Technology) (describing the Sacramento Kings’ proposed new sports arena); Home of the San 
Francisco 49ers, LEVI’S STADIUM, http://www.levisstadium.com (last visited May 15, 2017); Warri-
ors Make a Play for Mission Bay, GOLDEN ST. WARRIORS (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nba.com/warriors/news/warriors-sf-mission-bay-20140422 (detailing the Golden State 
Warriors’ proposed new arena); The New Multi-purpose Stadium in Arden Hills by the Numbers, 
MINN. VIKINGS, http://prod.static.vikings.clubs.nfl.com/assets/docs/print-ad-112211.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2017) (describing the Minnesota Vikings new stadium).  While there have been discussions 
in other cities about new sports facilities for existing teams—such as Phoenix for the NBA’s Suns and 
Milwaukee for the NBA’s Bucks—they are not included here, as no plans have been approved nor 
has financing been secured for construction.  See Craig Powers, Suns Discuss New Arena with City, 
Want to Destroy  
Historic Buildings, SBNATION (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2012/10/9/3478190/phoenix-suns-downtown-arena (discussing arena 
situation in Phoenix); Rich Kirchen, Lasry, Edens Retain Former Schwarzenegger Aide as PR Con-
sultant, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2014/07/24/lasry-edens-retain-former-schwarzenegger-
aide-as.html?page=all (describing the status of the Milwaukee arena). 
8. See Team-by-Team Information, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/team/ (last visited May 15, 2017) 
(listing the 30 MLB teams); Team Stats, Details, Videos, and News, NBA, 
http://www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited May 15, 2017) (listing the 30 NBA teams); NFL Teams, 
NFL, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited May 15, 2017) (listing the 32 NFL teams); and Teams, 
NHL, http://www.nhl.com/ice/teams.htm (last visited May 15, 2017) (listing the 30 NHL teams). 
9. The following is a list of arenas and stadiums that host more than one team: Barclays Center in 
New York City (NBA’s Nets and NHL’s Islanders); Staples Center in Los Angeles (NBA’s Lakers 
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haps it was understandable that people could not fully appreciate the arms race 
of sorts that states and municipalities were about to enter into with regard to 
building new arenas and stadiums in an attempt to keep or lure professional 
sports teams from other locales.10 
Nor would people at the time have appreciated how controversial new 
sports facilities would become.  Up until the 1990s, sports arenas and stadiums 
were almost always entirely paid for and owned by either a private party (or 
parties) or a governmental entity.11  Thereafter, a trend began—that continues 
today—of new sports facilities being owned by private entities but paid for, at 
least in part, by public financing.12  In fact, of the ninety-three sports facilities 
built since 1988—including those that are currently under construction or well 
into the planning process—seventy-eight of them received public financing, 
but are  
privately owned.13  This public financing movement has been met with great 
public resistance and skepticism, particularly as economists have questioned 
the wisdom and return on investment for cities and states that subsidize these  
privately-owned sports facilities.14  In these regards, observers in 1985 (or 
1988 for that matter) would not have fully appreciated or understood how rare 
and unprecedented Mrs. Pettit’s approach to financing a new sports facility 
was and would become. 
And yet, while much ink has been spilled regarding this new trend in the 
public financing of new sports arenas and stadiums—most of it critical— 
scholars and commentators alike have all but ignored or forgotten Mrs. Pettit’s 
                                                                                                                                               
and Clippers and NHL’s Kings); Oakland–Alameda County Coliseum in Oakland (NFL’s Raiders and 
MLB’s A’s); MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey (NFL’s Giants and Jets); TD Garden 
in Boston (NBA’s Celtics and NHL’s Bruins); United Center in Chicago (NBA’s Bulls and NHL’s  
Blackhawks); American Airlines Center in Dallas (NBA’s Mavericks and NHL’s Stars); Pepsi Center 
in Denver (NBA’s Nuggets and NHL’s Avalanche); Madison Square Garden in New York City 
(NBA’s Knicks and NHL’s Rangers); Wells Fargo Center in Philadelphia (NBA’s 76ers and NHL’s 
Flyers); Air Canada Centre in Toronto (NBA’s Raptors and NHL’s Maple Leafs); Verizon Center in  
Washington, D.C., (NBA’s Wizards and NHL’s Capitals).  See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5. 
10. See Parlow, Publicly Financed, supra note 4, at 488−92. 
11. See id. at 486. 
12. See id. at 492−96. 
13. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5. 
14. See Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the 
Cost?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 1, 1997), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sports-jobs-
taxes-are-new-stadiums-worth-the-cost/; see generally SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997); John 
Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 95, 103, 110 (2000).  
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unique model and vision.  That, hopefully, ends here.  This article seeks to 
trace the history of how the Bradley Center came to be and contextualize its 
unique and special model in the scholarly landscape of new sports facility fi-
nancing.  To that end, Part II will provide an overview of how new sports are-
nas and stadiums have been financed in the past few decades.  Part III will 
provide a history of the Bradley Center, including discussions of Mrs. Pettit, 
the need for a new arena in Milwaukee, the controversy surrounding the siting 
of the  
building, the expense and design of the building, and the creation of the unique 
corporation to oversee the Bradley Center.  Part IV will conclude with an  
analysis of what makes the Bradley Center and, indeed, Mrs. Pettit, both 
unique and compelling. 
II. TRADITIONAL FUNDING OF NEW SPORTS STADIUMS AND ARENAS 
Starting in the 1990s, cities and states experienced a shift away from host-
ing sports facilities that were exclusively paid for and owned by either a pri-
vate party/parties or a governmental entity.15  Instead, professional sports team  
owners began to demand at least some public financing to build a new sports 
arena or stadium.16  In fact, the average new sports facility—that was not  
entirely privately financed—received almost 70% of its construction costs 
through public financing.17  Seventy-eight of the ninety-three new sports  
facilities built since 1988—or that will be completed within the next few 
years—have received public financing.18  To provide such public financing, 
governmental entities—be they states, counties, cities, sports stadium districts, 
or the like—issue government bonds to pay for the construction of a new 
sports arena or stadium.19  To pay the debt service on these bonds, the gov-
ernmental entities almost always raise new revenue through one or more of 
several taxing options: sales, tourism, user, and/or sin taxes.20 
These new taxes have become very controversial and have been met with 
great political and public resistance.21  This is due, in part, to economic  
                                                            
15. See Parlow, Publicly Financed, supra note 4, at 494. 
16. See id. at 494−96. 
17. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5. 
18. See id. 
19. See Logan E. Gans, Take Me out to the Ballgame, But Should the Crowd’s Taxes Pay for It?, 
29 VA. TAX REV. 751, 753−63 (2010) (giving an overview of tax-exempt bonds and stadium/arena  
construction). 
20. See id. at 763−68. 
21. Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5, at 91.  See Don Walker, Economic Promises Got It Built. Has 
It Paid? - The Team Is Successful, Miller Park May Draw 3 Million This Year, but Economists De-
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consultants providing unrealistic revenue growth and repayment projections 
for new sports facilities.22  Moreover, politicians have oversold the economic  
benefits of new sports arenas and stadiums and overestimated the projected tax 
revenue in order to lessen public concerns.23  Finally, while there is a general 
anti-tax sentiment pervading political discourse today, these taxes are also so 
controversial because each is somewhat flawed in its approach and thus feels 
illegitimate to those paying them.  A brief discussion of each is instructive. 
Some governmental entities repay their bonds by adding a new sales tax or 
increasing an existing one.24  The sales tax applies to taxable transactions—
though sometimes exceptions are created—within the government’s bounda-
ries.25  For example, the public financing for Coors Field and Sports Authority 
Field at Mile High in Denver were paid for by a 0.1% increase in the sales tax 
on retail sales in the seven counties in the Denver metropolitan area.26  How-
ever, there tends to be public opposition to sales taxes for a variety of reasons.  
Many residents feel that they do not benefit enough from the existence of the 
new sports facility sufficient to warrant the new or increased sales tax, particu-
larly if they are not sports fans.27  Moreover, sales taxes are regressive and  
disproportionately hurt the poor—a group less likely to be able to attend an 
event at a new sports arena or stadium.28  Finally, revenue generated from 
sales taxes fluctuates with the economy, so when there is a downturn, the gov-
ernment must oftentimes extend the tax longer than originally determined be-
cause of less-than-expected revenues.29 
                                                                                                                                               
bate Whether the Community Is Benefiting, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2008, at A1 (noting 
that  
Wisconsin State Senator George Petak became the first state official to be recalled by voters after  
casting the deciding vote to provide public financing for the construction of Miller Park). 
22. See Ken Belson, As Revenue Plunges, Stadium Boom Deepens Municipal Woes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 2009, at B8. 
23. See Mark Yost, The Business of Sport: The Price of Football That Even Nonfans Pay, WALL 
STREET J., Feb. 3, 2011, at D6 (explaining how politicians use money from other funds to pay for sta-
dium bond debt service when the yearly tax revenue fell short of projections). 
24. See Gans, supra note 19, at 766. 
25. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5, at 87. 
26. Football Stadium District Sales Tax Expired December 31, 2011, ACCT. & TAX SOLUTIONS, 
INC. (Jan. 7, 2012), https://www.acctaxsolutions.net/football-stadium-district-sales-tax-expired-
december-31-2011/.  
27. See Andrew H. Goodman, Comment, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums: 
Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW J. 173, 194 (2002). 
28. See Todd Senkiewicz, Comment, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8 SETON 
HALL J. SPORT. L. 575, 585 (1998). 
29. See Alex B. Porteshawver, Comment, Green Sports Facilities: Why Adopting New  
Green-Building Policies Will Improve the Environment and the Community, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
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Tourist taxes are taxes on hotels, motels, and other places of lodging; rent-
al cars; and other services aimed at those visiting from outside of the area.30  
For example, the public debt for Ford Field in Detroit was serviced by revenue 
raised through a 2% car rental tax and a 1% hotel room tax.31  While tourist 
taxes are perhaps the most popular—or at least politically palatable—revenue 
source to repay public debt on new sports facilities, they, too, meet public  
resistance.32  Because they usually require a higher percentage for a longer  
period of time than sales taxes, tourist taxes can hurt a region’s tourism.33  It is 
unsurprising, then, that in addition to public opposition, various businesses  
dependent on tourists also resist such a funding mechanism.  In addition, like 
sales taxes, tourist taxes can fluctuate with the economy and thus sometimes 
fall short of projections—requiring an extension of the tax beyond the prom-
ised sunset period.34 
Several governmental entities have installed user taxes to help repay pub-
lic debt on new sports arenas and stadiums.  A user tax is a targeted tax that 
applies to those who use the sports facility through a ticket and/or parking tax 
or  
surcharge.35  For example, Indianapolis uses a 1% ticket surcharge to help re-
pay its debt on Lucas Oil Stadium.36  However, because of federal tax law re-
lated to tax-exempt government bonds, user taxes are limited in their ability to 
raise enough money to repay most, if not all, public debt on new sports facili-
ties.37  In addition, professional sports teams tend to oppose user taxes because 
there is a finite amount that consumers will spend on sports tickets, and what-
ever  
portion of the cost of a ticket goes to a user tax, the less money the team 
makes off ticket sales.  Finally, a less-common repayment option for public 
                                                                                                                                               
REV. 241, 250 (2009). 
30. See Senkiewicz, supra note 28, at 586−87. 
31. See Karen Bouffard & Brad Heath, Attorney General Reverses ‘Tourist Tax’- Cox: Wayne 
County No Longer Can Collect from Firms That Run Taxis, Busses and Limos, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 
8, 2005, at 3B. 
32. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5, at 92. 
33. See Garrett Johnson, The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities, 10 U. 
DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 3, 14−15 (2011). 
34. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5, at 92. 
35. See Brent Bordson, Comment, Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held  
Hostage by Professional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 505, 520 (1998). 
36. See Judd Zulgad, Colts Show Vikings How to Get a Stadium, STAR TRIB., Sept. 15, 2008, at 
1B. 
37. See Gregory W. Fox, Note, Public Finance and the West Side Stadium: The Future of Stadium 
Subsidies in New York, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 477, 484−85 (2005) (explaining the ten percent test for  
tax-exempt bonds under the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
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debt is a sin tax.  These are “special excise taxes on goods that the government 
wants to discourage, such as alcohol and tobacco products.”38  The most prom-
inent  
example of a sin tax is in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where there is a sin tax on 
beer, wine, hard alcohol, and cigarettes to pay the debt service on the Cleve-
land Browns Stadium, Progressive Field, and Quicken Loans Arena.39  While 
some favor sin taxes because of feelings of moral correctness, others oppose 
them because they target products and behavior that do not have a clear con-
nection to stadium/arena use.40 
 In these regards, the various ways in which governmental entities repay 
public debt on new sports facilities are politically unpopular and thus  
increasingly difficult to effect.  However, even those new sports facilities that 
are heralded as entirely privately financed are also not immune from criticism 
and public opposition.  This is due to the fact that the owners of these new 
sports arenas and stadiums oftentimes receive other forms of public subsidies.  
These include the transfer of valuable government-owned land to the owner 
for little or no cost, as well as millions of dollars in public infrastructure im-
provements to service the new sports facility.41  In addition, owners of these  
privately-financed stadiums and arenas often contemplate significant  
development around the new sports facility and receive favorable development 
approvals and incentives to help bolster their return on investment.42  Moreo-
ver, not all new privately-financed arenas have gone well.  For example, the 
                                                            
38. Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5, at 88. 
39. See Joan Mazzolini, “Sin Tax” Has More than Paid Its Fair Share, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Aug. 28, 2005, at B1.  
40. See Goodman, supra note 27, at 196. 
41. See Nat’l Sports Law Inst., Marquette Univ. Law Sch., National Football League, 14 SPORTS 
FACILITY REP. app. 3, at 5 (2013), https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/nfl-2013.pdf (not-
ing that the City of Charlotte provided $50 million worth of land donation and $10 million of infra-
structure improvement to help build the Bank of America Stadium); see also Nat’l Sports Law Inst., 
Marquette Univ. Law Sch., National Basketball Association, 14 SPORTS FACILITY REP. app. 2, at 3 
(2013), https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/nba-2013.pdf.  
42. See History, AIR CANADA CENTRE, http://www.theaircanadacentre.com/about/History.asp 
(last visited May 15, 2017) (discussing the development around the arena); see also PATRIOT PLACE, 
http://www.patriot-place.com (last visited May 15, 2017) (evidence of the significant development  
undertaken by New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft around Gillette Field); see also Mike Hager, 
Vancouver City Council Approves Aquilini’s Three New Highrise Towers Beside Rogers Arena, 
VANCOUVER SUN (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/productiveconversations/Vancouver+city+council+approves
+Aquilini+three+highrise+towers+beside+Rogers+Arena/6961948/story.html?__federated=1 (de-
scribing the three new high-rise towers that the  
owners of the Rogers Arena will build next to the stadium). 
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Franklin County Sports Authority in Ohio was forced to buy the Nationwide 
Arena in Columbus, Ohio—an arena that was entirely privately-financed—
because the owners were unable to afford it, and there was a fear that the Co-
lumbus Blue Jackets of the National Hockey League would relocate from the 
area.43   
In all of these regards, the twenty-six years since the opening of the Brad-
ley Center have seen great controversy and significant amounts of public dol-
lars spent on building new sports facilities that have been owned by private 
owners.  Much scholarly attention has focused on this phenomenon, often-
times with great criticism.  However, curiously missing from this scholarly 
discussion has been the lone exception to the ninety-two other new sports fa-
cilities that have been built since 1988: Mrs. Pettit’s gift of the Bradley Center 
to the Milwaukee and Wisconsin communities. 
III. THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE BRADLEY CENTER 
  A. Jane Bradley Pettit 
To better understand the uniqueness of the Bradley Center, one must first 
get a sense of the benefactress.  Jane Bradley Pettit may have been Milwau-
kee’s most generous and extraordinary philanthropist.44  Indeed, in 1999, 
Worth  
Magazine ranked Mrs. Pettit as the 27th most generous American.45  Both  
individually and through her foundation, Mrs. Pettit donated more than $250 
million to the Milwaukee area.46  However, this figure does not account for the 
unknown amounts of anonymous gifts that Mrs. Pettit gave to various projects 
and organizations.47  Mrs. Pettit focused her philanthropy on “initiat[ing] and 
sustain[ing] projects that promote[d] the welfare of families and children, the 
                                                            
43. Doug Caruso, Taxpayers Now Own Nationwide Arena, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 30, 
2012), http://www.dispatch.com/bluejacketsxtra/content/stories/2012/03/30/taxpayers-now-own-
nationwide-arena.html.  
44. See Pete Millard & Julie Sneider, Jane Pettit Was Philanthropist Beyond Compare, 
MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Sept. 16, 2001), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2001/09/17/story6.html 
?page=all.  
45. Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2, at 48.  
46. Philanthropist Jane Pettit Dies, CJONLINE, (Sept. 12, 2001), 
http://cjonline.com/stories/091201/usw_pettit.shtml.  Mrs. Pettit’s foundation, the Jane Bradley Pettit 
Foundation, is still in existence and continues to make contributions to various Milwaukee non-profit 
organizations.  See Welcome, JANE BRADLEY PETTIT FOUND., http://www.jbpf.org/index.html (last 
visited May 15, 2017). 
47. See Millard & Sneider, supra note 44. 
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elderly and disadvantaged people in Milwaukee.”48   
 Mrs. Pettit was born Margaret Jane Sullivan in 1918 to Dwight Sullivan 
and Margaret “Peg” Blakney, who later divorced in 1926.49  That year, when 
Mrs. Pettit was seven years old, her mother married Harry Bradley.50  Bradley 
adopted Mrs. Pettit and changed her name to Jane Bradley.51  Bradley was the 
co-founder of the Allen-Bradley Company, which sold in 1985 for $1.65  
billion—more than any other privately-held corporation.52  Mrs. Pettit was a 
beneficiary to the sale of the Allen-Bradley Company.53  Soon after the sale of 
the company, Mrs. Pettit and her husband, Lloyd Pettit, announced their  
intention to build a new sports and entertainment facility for the Milwaukee 
community.54  Mrs. Pettit chose to name the building the Bradley Center in 
honor of her father.55 
  B. The Birth of the Idea for a New Arena 
The context for how the Bradley Center came to fruition was far more  
nuanced than the mere sale of the Allen-Bradley Company.  There was a need 
for a new arena driven, in large part, by the problems with the arena in which 
the Milwaukee Bucks played, the Milwaukee Exposition, Convention Center 
and Arena (MECCA).  The seating capacity for the existing basketball arena, 
the MECCA, was only 11,052—the lowest capacity for any NBA arena.56  
Due in large part to the inadequacy of the revenues produced by the MECCA 
for the Bucks, on February 5, 1985, owner James Fitzgerald announced that he 
was putting the team up for sale.57  Business executive (and later United States  
Senator) Herb Kohl decided to step in and buy the Bucks for $18 million with 
                                                            
48. Letter from the Board, JANE BRADLEY PETTIT FOUND., http://www.jbpf.org/letter/index.html 
(last visited May 15, 2017). 
49. See Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2, at 52.   
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Fran Bauer, Arena Could Open in ’86: Pettits Say New Center Will Be at Stadium, Not  
Downtown, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 6, 1985, pt. 1, at 1 [hereinafter Bauer, Arena Could Open].  Van de 
Kamp Nohl, supra note 2, at 51. 
53. See Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2, at 51.  
54. See Bauer, Arena Could Open, supra note 52, at 1. 
55. Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2, at 46. 
56. See Fran Bauer, MECCA Seeks Opinion on Bradley Center Role, MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 29, 
1988, at 1B, 5B; Bauer, Arena Could Open, supra note 52, at 9. 
57. See Fran Bauer, Advisers Say Auditorium Is Best Site for New Arena, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 5, 
1985, pt. 1, at 1A, 6A [hereinafter Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium]. 
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the hope of keeping the team in Milwaukee.58  To help effect this goal, Kohl 
stated that the team “would have to be playing in a new arena within three 
years to continue to operate at a profit.”59  This factor certainly played some 
part in the Pettits’ decision to build the Bradley Center, as they emphasized the  
importance of keeping the Bucks in Milwaukee when announcing the gift.60  
However, the main driving force behind Mrs. Pettit’s generosity was to pro-
vide the Milwaukee community with a premier sports and entertainment facili-
ty in the memory of her father, Harry Bradley.61 
Given the inadequacy of the MECCA, it was unsurprising that others  
considered building a new arena in Milwaukee.  One Southern California-
based group, Gardens Partnership, sought to purchase the Bucks and build and 
operate a new arena in which the team could play.62  The California group lost 
out on the bidding to Kohl, and though the group was still interested in build-
ing a new arena—through the use of industrial revenue bonds—the Pettits 
were able to accomplish this sooner given their extraordinary gift.63  Interest-
ingly, Allan Durkovic, the managing partner of the Gardens Partnership, iden-
tified two areas that would be challenging for whomever built the new arena: 
choosing a  
location and the amount of political infighting in Milwaukee.64  Durkovic 
proved to be prophetic, as both became significant headaches for the Pettits, as 
described further below in Part III.C. 
Surprisingly—perhaps even incredibly—the announcement of the Pettits 
to build the Bradley Center was met with mixed reactions.  While many in the 
community lauded the Pettits’ generosity, some questioned whether the real  
motivation behind the gift was that the donation would be considered charita-
ble and thus qualify for a tax deduction.65  This reaction is a bit mystifying as 
it ignores the reality that if that were the Pettits’ interest, they could have do-
nated the same amount of money to another non-profit organization to gain the 
same tax benefit.  Nevertheless, the Pettits’ attorney, Joseph E. Tierney, Jr., 
assured the public that the gift was not motivated by any potential tax break 
                                                            
58. See Sale of Bucks Began Long Debate, supra note 2, at 12. 
59. See Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57, at 1. 
60. See Bauer, Arena Could Open, supra note 52, at 9.  In fact, Lloyd Pettit indicated that they 
would have purchased the team if no other local owner could be found.  See id. 
61. Amy Rinard, Honoring Bradley with a Building for All to Enjoy, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, 
Sept. 29, 1988, at 7.  
62. Fran Bauer, Californians Want to Build Arena Here, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 3, 1985, pt. 2, at 1.  
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. See Ray Kenney, Then There Are Tax Breaks . . ., MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 6, 1985, pt. 1, at 8.  
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but that “‘[i]t came from the heart, not the head.’”66  Others remarkably sug-
gested that the Pettits should use their money in other ways.  For example, 
Milwaukee County Executive William O’Donnell urged the Pettits to consider 
placing the money for the arena into a trust fund that could be used to keep the 
Milwaukee Brewers and the Bucks in Milwaukee.67  O’Donnell proposed that 
the City of Milwaukee build a new arena instead, but the Pettits politely de-
clined the  
suggestion.68  These odd initial contrary reactions set the stage for what was to 
be the biggest hurdle to building the Bradley Center: its location. 
C.  Siting the New Building 
1.  County Stadium Site 
When the Pettits announced their gift to construct the Bradley Center on 
March 5, 1985, they were adamant that it be built near County Stadium, the 
home of the Milwaukee Brewers, in the Menomonee Valley just southwest of 
downtown Milwaukee.69  The Pettits wanted this site because it was centrally 
located, had existing parking, and the City of Milwaukee could provide the 
land for the building.70  Most importantly to the Pettits, the location allowed 
for  
construction of the Bradley Center to commence immediately.71  The Pettits 
hoped to have the arena built by July 31, 1987, in order to accommodate the 
timeline for the Bucks.72  Ironically, the Pettits also believed that selecting the 
site near County Stadium would help avoid the “political quagmire” and  
“bickering” that would ultimately ensnare the project.73   
There was healthy support for the County Stadium site after the Pettits’  
announcement.  Milwaukee County Executive O’Donnell supported the site, 
suggesting that the land could be leased for ninety-nine years for $1 and that 
the lost parking—approximately 1,000 to 1,500 spaces—could be replaced by  
                                                            
66. Id. 
67. Alan J. Borsuk & Carolina Garcia, Pettits Say ‘No Thanks’ to O’Donnell’s Arena Plan, 
MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 25, 1985, pt. 1, at 1.  
68. See id. 
69. See Arena News Was at Center Arena, supra note 1. 
70. Bauer, Arena Could Open, supra note 52. 
71. Id. 
72. See Alan Borsuk, Odd Thing Happened on Way to New Arena, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 4, 1985, 
pt. 2, at 1.  
73. See Bauer, Arena Could Open, supra note 52, at 1. 
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purchasing additional land.74  Residents and business owners also supported 
building the new arena by County Stadium—in the hopes that the Bradley  
Center would spur other development and thus increase property values and 
business activity in the area.75  The general public also seemed supportive of 
the proposed location.  Sixty-one percent of those surveyed after the Pettits’  
announcement favored the County Stadium location for the new arena.76  In 
particular, those surveyed identified particular factors that influenced their  
support: no need to relocate existing buildings, existing parking, freeway ac-
cess, personal safety, proximity to their homes, potential economic develop-
ment for the area, and access to other facilities.77  
However, this initial burst of support eroded as influential members of the 
Milwaukee community spoke out publicly against the County Stadium  
location.78  Two opponents of the County Stadium site stood out the most:  
Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier.79 and the Milwaukee Brewers.80  Mayor 
Maier preferred to expand the MECCA instead of building a new arena.81  In 
the  
alternative, he wanted the Bradley Center to be built downtown, stating “[i]f 
we’re going to have a nighttime Downtown, which I think is significant to the 
kind of thriving metropolitan area that we are, we need the arena, we need the 
activity, we need the Bucks Downtown.”82   
The Brewers’ opposition to the County Stadium site seemed to sway the 
Pettits.  Then-owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, Bud Selig—who would later 
become Commissioner of Major League Baseball—expressed concerns that 
building the Bradley Center near County Stadium would impair parking,  
decrease attendance, and disrupt the stadium’s operations during construc-
                                                            
74. County Says It’ll Replace Lost Parking, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 6, 1985, pt. 2, at 1; Arena News 
Was at Center Arena, supra note 1, at 4B.  
75. See Don Behm, Stadium Neighbors See a Bright Future, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 7, 1985, pt. 2, 
at 1.  
76. Gary C. Rummler, Most Like Stadium Site, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 6, 1985, pt. 1, at 12.  
77. Id. (“For those who wanted a Stadium site, the reasons ranked in this order: parking 78%,  
freeway access 76%, personal safety 44%, closeness to their home 37%, economic development of 
the area where the arena would be built 31%, and access to other facilities 18%.”).  Id. 
78. The City of Milwaukee Common Council may have had a sense of this, as it passed a resolu-
tion on October 23, 1985, which both thanks the Pettits for their donation to build a new arena and  
encouraged siting the Bradley Center downtown if the County Stadium location did not work.  See 
City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1224 (Wis. 1985) (on file with author). 
79. See Mark Ward, Maier Details City’s Plan for Bradley Center, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 6, 1985, 
pt. 1, at 1.  
80. See What Next for Bradley Center?, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 20, 1985, pt. 1, at 14. 
81. Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57. 
82. Maier s ‘Satisfied’ with 3 Leading Sites, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 20, 1985, pt. 1, at 12. 
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tion.83  The Brewers asserted that 5,700 parking spots would be needed in ad-
dition to the 1,500 spots that were already being proposed.84  The Brewers also 
worried about traffic congestion that would arise if County Stadium and the 
Bradley Center hosted events at the same time.85  Milwaukee County attempt-
ed to  
alleviate the Brewers’ concerns with a report that proposed a plan that would 
allow both facilities to coexist.86  The report explained how the parking needs 
could be met by the County purchasing or leasing land near the stadium,  
additional parking being provided by State Fair Park, and the county building 
additional parking structures.87  Milwaukee County’s report also addressed  
traffic congestion by proposing a new freeway off-ramp, a radio alert system 
to help drivers with stadium/arena traffic, and collaboration between the two  
facilities to minimize scheduling conflicts.88  
Despite the County’s efforts to address and alleviate concerns regarding 
the proposed site, the Brewers remained opposed to the new arena being built 
near County Stadium.  In fact, the Brewers claimed that siting the Bradley 
Center there could be the “last straw” that could eventually force the Brewers 
to  
relocate from Milwaukee.89  Marquette University also joined the Brewers in 
their opposition because it wanted to host its men’s basketball games  
downtown.90  After hearing about such opposition—in particular, the Brewers’ 
stance—the Pettits decided to find a different site for the new arena.91 
2.  Other Possibilities 
With the Pettits’ willingness to build the Bradley Center elsewhere, a task 
force was formed to study other possible locations.92  Several groups and  
                                                            
83. What Next for Bradley Center?, supra note 80. 
84. Fran Bauer & Lawrence C. Lohmann, Brewers Question County Report, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 
19, 1985, pt. 2, at 1.  
85. See id. 
86. See Tom Ahern, Brewers, Worried by Arena, Study Building Stadium, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, 
Nov. 19, 1985, pt. 1, at 1. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. What Next for Bradley Center?, supra note 80. 
90. See Larry Sandler et al., Businesses on Third St. Fight Arena, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 4, 
1985, pt. 1, at 15.  
91. See Gerald Kloss, Bradley Center Site Still up in Air, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 23, 1985, at 4B.  
92. See Fran Bauer, 2 Suburbs Eager to Get New Arena, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 27, 1985, pt. 2, at 1 
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localities lobbied the task force for consideration of their preferred site.  In-
deed, some suburban residents were excited about the possibility of building 
the new arena outside of the City of Milwaukee.93  One suburb, the City of 
West Allis, suggested two possible locations within its boundaries for the 
Bradley Center: State Fair Park and land owned by the Allis-Chalmers Com-
pany.94  The City of West Allis thought that State Fair Park was a compelling 
site because of its close proximity to downtown Milwaukee, and because the 
Olympic Ice Rink95 and a proposed new hotel would complement the addition 
of the Bradley Center.96  The City of West Allis also believed that the Allis-
Chalmers site was attractive because a private corporation owned the land—a 
factor that many believed could help speed up the process.97  
The Historic Third Ward Association—a group of ninety property owners 
in the Third Ward—proposed that the Bradley Center be sited just west of the 
Summerfest Grounds in the Third Ward.98  Milwaukee County Executive 
O’Donnell opposed this site because the area in question was typically “used 
as [the] staging area for the Circus Parade.”99  Milwaukee Mayor Maier also 
weighed in with a proposed lakefront site for the Bradley Center.100  The 
mayor favored the idea because the site was comprised of 7.4 acres and had 
ample county-owned land that could be used for parking in the area.101   
Environmentalists vehemently opposed the lakefront site.102  Even Milwaukee 
County Executive O’Donnell seemed unimpressed with the proposal: 
“[P]eople ‘have spent a lifetime trying to keep things off the lakefront so peo-
ple could use it.’”103  Other elected officials also opposed this proposed site.104  
                                                                                                                                               
[hereinafter Bauer, Suburbs Extend Welcome]. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. It is worth noting that Mrs. Pettit’s philanthropic generosity enable the City of West Allis—
and the Milwaukee region more generally—to secure an Olympic training facility when she donated  
approximately $9 million to construct the Pettit National Ice Center.  Millard & Sneider, supra note 
44.  
96. Bauer, Suburbs Extend Welcome, supra note 92. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. Thomas Collins & Bruce Gill, Maier Says He’d Fight for Lakefront Arena Site, MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Dec. 13, 1985, pt. 1, at 5.  
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (noting that O’Donnell would not reveal whether he was opposed to the site or not). 
104. Id. (detailing the opposition of Senator Barbara Ulichny and Representative Barbara 
Notestein). 
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Finally, a unique proposal surfaced to demolish the MECCA and build the 
Bradley Center on that site.105  Those advocating for this proposal claimed that 
this approach was the least expensive way to build a new arena downtown 
with an estimated cost of $31 million.106  While the task force gave varying 
degrees of  
consideration to these and other proposals, none of them were ultimately  
selected. 
3.  Site Resolution 
After this community deliberation, in December of 1985, the Pettits agreed 
to build the Bradley Center downtown, and the site was selected: near the  
Journal Company’s parking lots near North 5th Street and West State Street.107  
In conjunction with this announcement, the Milwaukee Common Council also 
passed a resolution directing city officials to enter into a contract with Bradley 
Center officials.108  The contract was to include various terms, including the 
site of the Bradley Center, the City of Milwaukee’s obligations to purchase the  
property and clear existing structures on it, close certain streets during  
construction of the building, and purchase land and build a new parking  
structure to service the Bradley Center.109 
 Many people in Milwaukee recognized this location as “the quickest way 
to complete a new sports complex.”110  There were several compelling  
characteristics about the site that influenced this decision: close proximity to 
the MECCA (which many saw as a benefit so that the two entities could coor-
dinate schedules), easy freeway access, and minimal demolition costs.111  To 
                                                            
105. See Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57. 
106. Id. 
107. See Finally, a Fine Bradley Center Site, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 24, 1985, pt. 1, at 6.  See also 
City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1661 (Wis. 1986) (stating that the Redevelopment  
Authority designated this site for the Bradley Center and that the Common Council approved the cho-
sen site) (on file with author).   
108. City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1224-b (Wis. 1985). 
109. See id. 
110. Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57.  Interestingly, this site was not originally 
considered in March of 1985 because of Mayor Meier’s reluctance to work with the Journal Compa-
ny.  Fran Bauer, Banker’s Efforts Helped Nail down Bradley Site, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 24, 1985, pt. 
1, at 1.  Some attributed Mayor Meier’s reticence to his dissatisfaction with how the Journal Company  
reported the news.  Id.  John H. Kelly—a prominent businessman and political insider—was credited 
with helping select this site because of his negotiations with property owners, city officials, and the 
MECCA board.  See id. 
111. Finally, a Fine Bradley Center Site, supra note 107. 
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be sure, there were some logistical hurdles before construction of the Bradley 
Center could commence.  For example, the City of Milwaukee had to relocate 
several businesses and organizations from in and around the site.112  In addi-
tion, the City needed to provide temporary parking for the Journal Company’s  
employees while they built a new parking structure for them.113  This activity 
took some time, but in October 1986, ground was broken for construction of 
the Bradley Center.114 
 
D.  The Bradley Center Expenses 
1.  The Design of the Building and the Rising Construction Cost for the Pettits 
The original cost estimate for the Bradley Center was $35 million,115 and 
the Pettits initially agreed to pay between $30 and $40 million to construct the 
new building.116  This range reflected comparable prices of arenas built  
elsewhere in the United States.117  However, after speaking with architects, the 
Pettits revised their contribution number to $53 million, as their goal was to 
build one of the best arenas in the country.118  Indeed, the cost of the Bradley 
Center ultimately reached approximately $90 million in achieving this goal, 
and Mrs. Pettit agreed to pay for the entire amount, despite an initial expecta-
tion of a cost nearly one-third of this amount.119 
Part of the increase in cost was due to the Pettits’ insistence that only  
high-quality materials be used to construct the Bradley Center so that it would 
“offer more conveniences than those to which the public is accustomed in 
large arenas.”120  One of the unique features, at the time, was the separate con-
                                                            
112. See Pieces that Still Must Fit into Place Before Building the Bradley Center, MILWAUKEE J., 
May 21, 1986,  pt. 1, at 12.  
113. Id. 
114. See Arena Highlights, BMO HARRIS BRADLEY CTR. 
http://www.bmoharrisbradleycenter.com/arena-info/arena-highlights (last visited May 15, 2017). 
115. Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57. 
116. See Fran Bauer, Arena to Cost Pettits $53 Million, MILWAUKEE J., May 21, 1986, pt. 1, at 
1A [hereinafter Bauer, Arena to Cost]. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2. 
120. See Mark Ward, Mammoth Undertaking: Bradley Center an Impressive Engineering Feat, 
MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 30, 1986, at pt. 1, at 1 [hereinafter Ward, Mammoth Undertaking]. See also 
Crocker Stephenson, Pettits’ Demand for Quality Led to $18 Million Overrun, MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 1988, at 1A (noting that the special lighting system, stainless steel hand railings, 
the amount of granite, and the number of escalators, among other features, all contributed to the in-
crease in  
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courses on three different levels—each of which included its own concession 
stands and restrooms.121  This compared to an arena in Kansas City that was 
criticized for having only one concourse with just two women’s restrooms and 
four men’s restrooms.122  To avoid a similar problem, the architects planned to 
have sixteen restrooms—eight men’s restrooms and eight women’s re-
strooms—spread throughout the different concourses and separate restrooms 
for each individual suite.123  The extensive use of granite—both internally and 
for the external  
facing of the building—and the estimated 55,000 square feet of glass for  
construction of the grand atriums near the entrances of the arena helped  
distinguish the Bradley Center from other arenas, and furthered its high-
quality image.124 
The design of the Bradley Center’s roof was also a focal point that its  
architects believed would make it superior to other arenas.125  The architects 
rejected a dome-style roof in favor of a pitched roof with an octagonal pro-
file.126  They believed that the pitched roof would help the building serve as an 
icon and landmark, as the roof was estimated to “[s]oar[ ] yet another eight 
stories above the five-story street façade.”127  The pitched roof was also de-
signed to “improve ventilation and [thus] make the arena . . . less smoky.”128  
Another unique design of the Bradley Center was the intentional layout of the 
interior of the building to reduce foot traffic problems in the main lobby.129  
This goal was effected by the inclusion of sixteen escalators and various stair-
ways going in different  
directions to ensure that all foot traffic was not going in the same direction at 
the same time.130  In addition, the architects designed the concourses to be 
wide enough to keep foot traffic separated from those people waiting for con-
                                                                                                                                               
construction costs).  See also Bradley Center Facts and Figures, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 30, 1986, at 
1A (detailing that more than three miles worth of hand railings were used for the building).  
121. Ward, supra note 120. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Idi. 
125. See Rick Romell, ‘Quiet’ Newcomer Is Something to Shout About, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, 
Sept. 29, 1988, at 10. 
126. Ward, supra note 120. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.  The roof was also made of copper, which made it more durable. 
129. Jay Joslyn, Colossal Bradley Center Retains Personal Quality, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 
3, 1988, pt. 1, at 10.  
130. See id. 
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cessions so as to keep the flow of traffic moving.131 
Finally, the architects designed the Bradley Center to address the  
deficiencies identified with the MECCA, in particular the lack of seating.   
Accordingly, the Bradley Center expanded seating capacity to accommodate 
17,600 patrons for hockey; 18,400 for basketball; and 20,000 for concerts.132  
Consistent with their desire to use high-quality materials for the building, the 
Pettits chose to purchase upholstered seats to make them more comfortable,  
instead of the standard plastic seats.133  In these various ways, the Bradley  
Center’s design seemed to accomplish the goal to which the Pettits and  
architects aspired: to make the arena “second to none in the nation.”134 
2.  Some (Limited) Public Contribution to the Project and How to Repay It 
While the Pettits’ contribution paid for the building itself, there were other 
costs associated with the larger Bradley Center project.  The City of Milwau-
kee had to pay for acquisition of some land, demolition of existing buildings, 
and the relocation of several businesses and organizations on the site.135  For  
example, the City had to buy, demolish, and/or relocate the Milwaukee Rescue 
Mission, Mint Bar, Standard Electric Supply Company, a McDonald’s  
restaurant, and a Church’s Fried Chicken restaurant.136  The City also had to 
build a new parking structure that would hold between 2,300 and 2,450 cars 
                                                            
131. Id. 
132. See Stephenson, supra note 120.  
133. Id.  Interestingly, one feature of the design plan that was rejected was a skywalk that would 
have connected the Bradley Center with the MECCA and a parking garage.  See Ward, supra note 
120.  The City of Milwaukee’s indecision on where to place the parking garage—to which the sky-
walk would connect—led to the skywalk not being built.  See Fran Bauer, Bradley Center Design Un-
veiled: Glass Entryway, Escalators, Skywalks to Enhance Tall New Arena, MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 12, 
1986, pt. 1, at 1.  Bradley Center architect Chris Carver stated at the time, “[w]e have provided the 
ability to add a  
skywalk in the future, but it doesn’t make a lot of sense . . . .”  Ward, supra note 120.   
134. Ward, supra note 120. 
135. See Pieces that Still Must Fit into Place Before Building the Bradley Center, supra note 112.  
The City required the Redevelopment Authority to submit a redevelopment plan for the site, which 
the Common Council approved.  City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1661-a (Wis. 1986) 
(on file with author).  The Common Council approved an amendment to the redevelopment plan al-
most a year later.  See City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res. 85-1661-e (Wis. 1986) (on file with 
author).   
136. Pieces that Still Must Fit into Place Before Building the Bradley Center, supra note 112.  
The City required the Redevelopment Authority to submit a relocation plan for any businesses or non-
profit organizations that needed to be relocated because of the Bradley Center project.  City of Mil-
waukee Common Council, Res. 85-1661-b (Wis. 1986) (on file with author).  The Common Council 
approved these plans.  See id. 
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for the new influx of people into the area.137  All of these various tasks cost the 
City $9.9 million, which the City paid for through loans and money from a  
contingency fund.138   
Repayment of this amount became a hotly-contested issue and several  
options were explored.  One option was for the City to take out revenue bonds 
that would be repaid from revenue earned from the parking structures.139   
Another proposal contemplated a 1% tax on food and beverages purchased in 
Milwaukee—excluding grocery stores—to repay the debt.140  This proposal 
was modeled off of other cities’ experiences—Indianapolis, Kansas City, New  
Orleans, and St. Petersburg—and was calculated to raise approximately $4.5 
million per year initially.141  Milwaukee Common Council President John  
Kalwitz offered an alternative suggestion of raising the “hotel-motel” tax—
what we call a tourist tax today—from 6% to 8% or 10%.142  Another proposal 
was for the City to increase parking fees above the amount needed to cover the 
costs of constructing the parking structures to pay for the additional land ac-
quisition, demolition, and relocation costs.143 
None of these proposals gained traction, so the conversation migrated to a 
ticket tax.  The Milwaukee Common Council introduced a bill that would as-
sess a 5% tax on all tickets sold for events at the Bradley Center.144  The 
Common Council believed that the ticket tax was the appropriate vehicle for 
repaying the $9.9 million investment because it would only affect those who 
                                                            
137. See Pieces that Still Must Fit into Place Before Building the Bradley Center, supra note 112. 
138. Bauer, Arena to Cost, supra note 116; See Bruce Gill, Kalwitz Wants Options on Bradley  
Center Costs, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 24, 1986, pt. 1, at 5.  $9.4 million of the total came from 
loans, while $500,000 was taken from a contingency fund.  Id.  See also City of Milwaukee Common 
Council, Res. 85-1649 (Wis. 1985) (authorizing the City to issue $3.9 million in promissory notes in 
order to “provid[e] financial assistance to blight elimination, slum clearance, community development 
and urban renewal programs.”) (on file with author); City of Milwaukee Common Council, Res.  
85-1649-b (Wis. 1986) (expanding the qualifying activity description to include “funding the  
Redevelopment Authority’s redevelopment activities in the North 5th Street/West State Street (Brad-
ley Center) Project,” including “planning, engineering, property acquisition, relocation, site clearance,  
public improvements, parking, and sidewalk related costs.”) (on file with author); City of Milwaukee 
Common Council, Res. 85-1651 (Wis. 1985) (appropriating $500,000 of the $3.9 million specifically 
to Bradley Center activities such as property acquisition, demolition and relocation services, parking, 
and other public improvements). 
139. See Bauer, Arena to Cost, supra note 116. 
140. Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57. 
141. Id. 
142. Gill, supra note 138. 
143. See Bradley Center Needn’t Hurt Taxpayers, MILWAUKEE J., May 22, 1986, pt. 1, at 18.  
144. Bruce Gill, Bradley Center Urges Rejection of Ticket Tax, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 3, 
1987, pt. 1, at 16.  
PARLOW 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  10:04 AM 
290 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
could afford the price of a ticket, whereas a general sales tax increase would 
not differentiate between purchasers—a common concern regarding blanket 
(and regressive) taxes.145  Democrats in the Wisconsin State Assembly similar-
ly favored this  
approach, while other government officials opposed the idea.146  In fact, many 
officials believed that the proposed ticket tax “violate[d] the spirit of the  
agreement that brought the Bradley Center downtown.”147  In reaching an  
agreement with the Pettits to locate the Bradley Center downtown, the City of 
Milwaukee promised that it would “exempt the [facility] from real estate and 
personal property taxes ‘and/or payments in lieu of such taxes.’”148  Joseph E. 
Tierney, Jr., the Pettits’ attorney, stated that he believed the proposed ticket 
tax was in violation of that agreement because it would serve as “a tax in lieu 
of real estate and personal property taxes.”149  Others, such as Representative  
Barbara Notestein, disagreed with the position that the proposed ticket tax  
violated the agreement with the Pettits because the tax was on individuals, not 
the Bradley Center itself.150  Proponents of the proposed ticket tax inserted a 
provision in the state budget that would have permitted the City to assess such 
a ticket tax on tickets for events at the Bradley Center, but not other facili-
ties.151  Governor Tommy Thompson vetoed the proposed ticket tax from the 
state budget, saying that it was inappropriate for a proposed ticket tax to be 
placed in the state budget and that, even if it were appropriate, the tax itself 
was flawed because it applied only to the Bradley Center and no other facili-
ties in  
Milwaukee.152 
Given the failure of the proposed ticket tax and lack of other viable op-
tions, the City of Milwaukee chose to repay its $9.9 million investment 
through a property tax increase.153  The average City resident with a home val-
                                                            
145. See Surcharge on Tickets Is Worth Further Study, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 11, 1986, pt. 
1, at 10.  
146. See id.; Bill Hurley, Ticket Tax Endorsed for Bradley Center, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 
24, 1987, pt. 1, at 1 (explaining that Representative Dismas Becker noted that some city officials  
opposed a ticket tax and had even contemplated ticket taxes only for Marquette University students 
attending their school’s events at the Bradley Center). 
147. Gill, supra note 144. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See id. 
152. Dave Hendrickson, Ticket Tax Veto Leaves City Officials Fuming, MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 15, 
1987, at 5B.  
153. Bruce Gill, 5 Invited to Talk on Arena Financing, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 23, 1986, pt. 
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ued at $50,000 or more would have to pay roughly $6.26 more per year in 
property taxes for a ten-year period.154  Milwaukee Alderman Wayne Frank 
was a vocal opponent of the property tax solution, saying “[e]verybody should 
be fighting for our fair share of the state income tax and the state sales tax, ra-
ther than  
talking about putting new taxes on the backs of our property taxpayers.”155   
Alderman Frank went on to state that he thought the property tax approach 
was unfair because he believed that the majority of attendees at Bradley Cen-
ter events would not be from the City of Milwaukee.156  In the end, the proper-
ty tax increase prevailed because of a lack of other politically feasible options. 
Finally, the City of Milwaukee also entered into an agreement with the 
Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corporation—an entity discussed  
further in Part III.F—obligating the City to build a parking structure for, and 
adjacent to, the Bradley Center.157  In order to build the new parking structure, 
on August 1, 1986, the City entered into an agreement with the City of  
Milwaukee’s Redevelopment Authority—a separate legal entity158—to finance 
the new parking structure.159  In the agreement, the Redevelopment Authority 
agreed to issue revenue bonds in the amount of $25,515,000, and the City 
agreed to provide “financial and/or other assistance” to market the bonds, and 
for the general financing and development of the structure.160  The Redevel-
opment  
Authority also agreed to use the proceeds from the sale of the bonds to acquire 
                                                                                                                                               
1, at 5.  
154. See Mike Christopulos, Bradley Center Veto Could Cost Taxpayers, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, 
July 31, 1987, pt. 1, at 5.  
155. Gill, supra note 153. 
156. See Christopulos, supra note 154. 
157. See Contract Providing for the Implementation of the Bradley Center between the City of  
Milwaukee and the Bradley Ctr. Corp. (June 26, 1986) (no copy of this contract could be found in the 
City Attorney’s files, but it was referenced in a document entitled “Redevelopment Authority of the 
City of Milwaukee Revenue Bonds (Bradley Center Parking Facilities Project) Series 1986; Certifi-
cate of the City of Milwaukee, WI; August 4, 1987”) (on file with author).  See also City of Milwau-
kee Common Council, Res. 85-1224-b (Wis. 1985) (directing the City to enter into an agreement with 
the Bradley Center Corporation and requiring that the contract to include certain provisions) (on file 
with author). 
158. See Redevelopment Authority, CITY OF MILWAUKEE, 
http://city.milwaukee.gov/racm#.U9JoTsZtdok (last visited May 15, 2017). 
159. Cooperation Agreement between the City of Milwaukee and the Redevelopment Authority of 
the City of Milwaukee (Aug. 1, 1986) (on file with author).  In this agreement and other related  
documents in the City Attorney’s files, this agreement was referred to as the “Cooperation Agree-
ment.”  Id. 
160. Id. 
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the land for the parking structure, and to pay for the design and constructions 
costs associated with the structure.161  Pursuant to the agreement, the  
Redevelopment Authority issued the revenue bonds to pay for the construction 
of the new parking structure.162 
E.  The Opening of, and Reactions to, the Bradley Center 
When the Pettits announced their intention to build the Bradley Center in 
March of 1985, they made it clear that they wanted it open as soon as possi-
ble—with a goal of opening in October of 1987.163  This original timeline was  
inevitably delayed because of the political infighting among politicians and 
community leaders regarding the siting of the new building.164  The Pettits 
were understandably shocked by how long the siting decision took.165  In fact, 
Lloyd Pettit stated, “[w]hen we announced our plans to build the center on 
March 5 (1985), we didn’t realize it would take 19 months.  We though[t] we 
could just put it down.”166  To be sure, other factors also contributed to the de-
lay in the construction of the Bradley Center.167  For example, three Milwau-
kee County committees agreed to delay decisions on whether to relocate offic-
es near the Bradley Center site because of concerns about the possible closure 
of Old World Third Street.168  The opening date was thus pushed back to Oc-
tober of 1988.169  On October 1, 1988, the Bradley Center opened to the public 
for the first time in hosting an exhibition game between the Chicago Black-
hawks and the  
Edmonton Oilers.170 
Upon its opening, the Bradley Center was hailed as a symbol and source 
of city revitalization.171  Many saw the new arena as part of a process of  
                                                            
161. Id.  
162. Indenture of Trust between Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Milwaukee & First Wis. Tr. 
Co., art. II, § 201 (Aug. 1, 1986) (on file with author). 
163. See Kloss, supra note 91, at 4A.   
164. See Thomas Collins, Pettits Beam as Dignitaries Ballyhoo the Bradley Center, MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 1986, pt. 1,  at 1.  
165. See id. 
166. Id. 
167. See Panels Delay County Move Downtown, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 3, 1985, pt. 2, at 2.  
168. Id. 
169. See Amy Rinard, Bradley Center Is ‘on Schedule’ at Midpoint in Its Construction, 
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 1987, at 1.  
170. Arena Highlights, supra note 114. 
171. See Bradley Center Takes Its Place in Spotlight, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 8A (“The . . 
. Bradley Center, which opens tonight, is a monument not only to the magnanimity of its donors, Jane 
and Lloyd Pettit, but to a revitalizing city’s new-found confidence in itself.”).  Id. 
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revitalization that began with the construction of the Grand Avenue Mall,  
various housing projects, and the establishment of the Milwaukee Center  
Theater District.172  Developers and City of Milwaukee development officials 
also believed that the Bradley Center would spur more development.173  In-
deed, the planning for several new developments began after the Bradley Cen-
ter opened.174  Others believed that the Bradley Center could help unify those 
who lived to the east and west of the Milwaukee River—which bisects the 
City of Milwaukee—as well as keep people downtown at night.175  The con-
centration of people downtown in the evening was also important to restau-
rants, as one restaurant manager estimated that sporting events accounted for 
almost 50% of a downtown restaurant’s revenue.176  To be sure, there were 
some who  
expressed disappointment about aspects of the Bradley Center, including land 
acquisition and relocation costs for the City of Milwaukee,177 increased food 
prices at the arena,178 the location,179 and seating.180  However, overall—
indeed, the overwhelming sentiment—was that the Bradley Center was a sig-
nificant and important addition to Milwaukee.181 
F.  Creation of the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corporation 
Even before the Pettits’ Bradley Center gift went public, consultants  
                                                            
172. See id. 
173. See Thomas Collins, Center Seen as Spur to Development, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 20, 
1986, at 1.  
174. See id. (noting plans for at least two new hotels). 
175. Id. 
176. See id. 
177. See Sandler et al., supra note 90 (describing the concerns of Milwaukee County Supervisor 
Richard Nyklewicz, Jr., who stated, “I’m puzzled by how these things are developing, how a $40  
million gift is now going to cost the taxpayers an unknown amount of money.”).  Id. 
178. See, e.g., Bradley Center Earns Some Boos, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 9, 1988, at 22J, (noting  
concerns regarding the increase in prices of food and beverages at the Bradley Center compared to the 
MECCA); Amy Rinard, Food, Drinks Cost More at Bradley, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 1988, at 
1 (describing same).  
179. See Sandler et al., supra note 90 (explaining the disappointment of some with the downtown 
location, including Milwaukee County Supervisors Lawrence Kenny and Thomas Bailey). 
180. See Dale Hofmann, Use Imagination to See Finished Bradley Center, MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 1988, pt. 1, at 1 (explaining that while the Bradley Center could hold up to cer-
tain capacity crowds, it was unlikely it would do so consistently for most games and events).  There 
was also some concern about 250–300 seats that had obstructed views.  See Bob Berghaus, Bad View: 
250 to 300 Seats at Bradley Center Are Not Ideal, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 21, 1988, at 1C.   
181. See Collins, supra note 173. 
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suggested the formation of a non-profit corporation to oversee the construction 
and eventual operation of the new arena.182  Indeed, the day after the Pettits’ 
public announcement of their intention to build and donate the Bradley Center, 
Wisconsin Governor Anthony Earl requested that the Legislative Research  
Bureau draft a bill to create the Bucks Stadium Board, which would later  
become the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corporation 
(BCSEC).183  The purpose of the bill was to “create an independent agency . . . 
to operate [the future] stadium headed by [a] board (part-time).”184  One of the 
key reasons for creating a state-level entity—with its own governing board—
was “to keep above county battles”185 and “get it out of city politics.”186  The 
other important issue that needed resolution was whether to make the board a 
public or private entity.  The first draft of the bill designated the board as “not 
a state agency”—exempting it from open meetings law, open record requests, 
gift restrictions, and other laws and requirements that applied to state enti-
ties.187  This  
designation raised some concerns because it was unclear as to whether such an 
entity would still provide a tax benefit for Mrs. Pettit and whether she could 
give the Bradley Center to the board without state involvement.188  Eventually, 
the board was made a “state body” to provide for the gift tax exemption and 
for future tax exemption as well.189  After these issues were resolved, the 
                                                            
182. See Bauer, Advisers Favor Auditorium, supra note 57, at 6. 
183. See Legis. Reference Bureau Drafting Request 2890 (Mar. 6, 1985) (on file with author).  
184. Id.  Handwritten Notes Following Legis. Reference Bureau Drafting Request 2890 (on file 
with author). 
185. Handwritten Notes from Meeting with Harry F. Franke, Attorney, Legislator, and Lobbyist, 
Cook & Franke S.C., Following Legis. Reference Bureau Drafting Request 2890 (Mar. 7) (on file 
with author). 
186. Id.  Handwritten Notes from Meeting with Don K. Schott, Partner, Quarles & Brady LLP 
(Mar. 7) (on file with author). 
187. 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 2890/1. 
188. Compare id. with Handwritten Notes from Meeting with Juan Colas, Harry Franke, Hal  
Bergan, & Don Schott Following Legis. Reference Bureau Drafting Request 2890, at 1 (Mar. 13) 
(“Franke says no diff[erence] in tax [advantage between] the [two]? (Referring to the gift given di-
rectly to the state or to a non-profit directly)) with id. Notes from Call with Brian Wanesek (Mar. 7) 
(“. . . must be a particular kind of entity to get tax exemption, must tread fine line because it must be 
state, a possession of a state, or a polit[ical] subdivision.”).  See Wis. State Leg., 1985 Wis. Act 26, 
LRB  
drafting file 2890/1; Wis. State Leg., 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 2890/Pldn; Drafter’s Note 
from Jane Limprecht, Legislative Attorney, to Juan Colas, at 1 (Apr. 24, 1985).  
189. 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 2890/Pldn.; Drafter’s Note from Jane Limprecht,  
Legislative Attorney, to Juan Colas, supra note 188.  The tax-exempt status for the corporation was 
viewed by some as vulnerable to a possible state constitutional challenge under the Uniformity 
Clause.  See id.  Jark Stark, a legislative drafter with an expertise in tax was concerned about Board of 
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bill—Assembly Bill 291—was introduced in the State Assembly.190 
The first draft of the bill submitted to the legislature contained several  
noteworthy provisions.  For example, the tax exemption issue continued to  
garner attention.  The initial bill exempted the BCSEC from “property taxation 
all real and personal property . . . including related or auxiliary structures.”191  
This exemption applied both during the construction and operation of the  
Bradley Center provided that the facility was “owned by a non[-]profit  
corporation, the state or an instrumentality of the state.”192  As part of the  
legislative consideration by the Joint Survey Committee on Tax Exemptions—
the committee to which the bill was referred after its original introduction in 
the Committee on State Affairs in the State Assembly—the Wisconsin De-
partment of Revenue affirmed that there would be no property tax shift in giv-
ing such an exemption because the land upon which the Bradley Center was to 
be built was already exempt from property taxes.193 
There were two areas of the original bill that received some reworking by 
the legislature.  The first draft of the bill exempted the BCSEC from open  
records and open meetings laws.194  These exemptions caused a great deal of 
controversy.195  Part of the reason for the controversy lay in public expecta-
tion.  Wisconsin’s Open Records Law created a presumption that the public 
should (and will) have access to public records and that access should be de-
                                                                                                                                               
Trustees v. Outagamie County, 136 N.W. 619 (Wis. 1912), which held that “granting a property tax 
exemption to one member of a class of property owners rather than to the entire class violates the uni-
formity clause.”  Id. at 2. 
190. See Wis. State Leg., 1985 Assemb. B. 291 (Wis. 1985). 
191. J. SURVEY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPTIONS, 1985 Assemb. B. 291, at 1 (Wis. 1985). 
192. Id.  While the original intent of the bill seemed to contemplate a new successor entity to 
whom the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corporation (BCSEC) would transfer ownership, 
the board of directors of the corporation decided to continue to retain control of the Bradley Center.   
Bradley Center Owes Public More Openness, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 17, 1988, at 12A.  In fact, such a 
transfer of ownership never took place, as the BCSEC continues to own and operate the Bradley Cen-
ter.  See Joerres, Marotta Start New Terms with BMO Harris Bradley Center Board, BMO HARRIS 
BRADLEY CTR., http://www.bmoharrisbradleycenter.com/news/detail/joerres-marotta-start-new-
terms-with-bmo-harris-bradley-center-board (last visited May 15, 2017) (announcing the latest  
appointments to the Bradley Center Sports and Entertainment Corporation’s board of directors, which 
continues to run the recently-renamed BMO Harris Bradley Center). 
193. See id.  WIS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FISCAL ESTIMATE, 1985 Assemb. B. 291 (Wis. 1985). In 
addition, the bill contemplated no fiscal effect on the state budget or potential liability for claims 
made by future employees of the BCSEC.  See FISCAL ESTIMATE, 1985 Assemb. B. 291 (Wis. 1985). 
194. Bradley Center Bill Needs Repairs, MILWAUKEE J., May 17, 1985, pt. 1, at 12.  
195. See id. (asserting that lawmakers needed to keep the public interest in mind and that the pub-
lic interest was not served by the exemption from open records and open meetings laws). 
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nied only in exceptional circumstances.196  Moreover, the text of the Wiscon-
sin Open Meetings Law further emboldened opponents of the exemptions: 
“Every  
meeting of a governmental body shall be preceded by public notice as provid-
ed in [§] 19.84, and shall be held in open session.”197  In response to the public 
reaction to the exemptions, the legislature amended the bill to avoid an  
overarching exemption to these laws.198  The State Senate amended the bill—
and the State Assembly later approved the amendment—to include certain 
open meeting provisions.199  These requirements—which remained in the final 
bill and became law—included keeping meeting minutes, making those meet-
ing minutes available to the public, and making available to the public con-
tracts that exceeded $20,000 and for contracts involving ten or more events at 
the Bradley Center in a given year.200  However, this provision did not apply to 
concession contracts.201  Despite these changes, some public disapproval still 
lingered.202 
The second area of legislative focus and redrafting was the make-up of the 
BCSEC’s board of directors.  The bill originally called for a board of seven 
members—four nominated by local organizations and three by the governor.203  
The second draft included a provision where none of the appointees were  
subject to the advice and consent of the Wisconsin State Senate.204  When the 
Committee on State Affairs (of the State Assembly) considered the bill, it 
made two changes to the board requirements.205  First, the committee aban-
doned the original concept of four board nominations by local organizations, 
replacing them with gubernatorial appointments.206  Second, the committee in-
serted a  
requirement that at least three of the members of the board have executive or 
                                                            
196. WIS. STAT. § 19.31 (2016). 
197. WIS. STAT. § 19.83(1) (2016). 
198. See Charles E. Friederich, Bradley Center Bill OK’d in Senate, MILWAUKEE J., June 14, 
1985, pt. 2, at 3.  
199 See 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 0126/1, at 6, 7−8. 
200. See id.   
201. Id. at 8. 
202. See Bradley Center Bill Needs Repairs, supra note 194. 
203. See 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 2890/la.  The local organization appointments were 
to be made by the Greater Milwaukee Committee, Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Com-
merce, Milwaukee Labor Council, and Citizen’s Government Research Bureau.  Id. 
204. See id. at 1. 
205. See 1985 Assemb. B. 291, reprinted in ASSEMB. JOURNAL, 87th Reg. Sess., at 144, 160 (Wis. 
1985).  
206. See 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 0116/1, at 5. 
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business experience.207  The Senate Committee on Urban Affairs, Utilities, and 
Elections also considered the bill and made another change: All BCSEC board 
members must be residents of the State of Wisconsin.208  In the end, the  
legislature made various changes that resulted in board membership  
requirements that have remained consistent since their enactment in 1985.  
The board was changed to nine directors, all of whom were appointed by the  
governor.209  The final bill provided that six of the appointees must be  
Wisconsin residents and be approved with the advice and consent of the State 
Senate.210  The final three members were reserved for nominees of the Bradley 
Family Foundation.  Finally, the enacted law provided that board members 
held seven-year staggered terms, could not be elected officials, and could not 
be  
compensated for their duties.211 
After the State Assembly and State Senate amended the bill and agreed 
upon its final text, both houses passed Assembly Bill 291 in its amended form, 
and Governor Earl signed the bill.212  The bill officially became 1985 Wiscon-
sin Act 26 and was published on July 18, 1985.213  The law made the BCSEC 
both an instrumentality of the state and a non-profit corporation.214  It also ap-
proved the entity as the owner and operator of the Bradley Center.215  The 
statute also  
empowered the corporation in a variety of manners, including the ability to 
take a loan or grant, execute contracts, maintain an office, employ certain ex-
perts, and sue or be sued.216  At the same time, the law required the BCSEC to 
submit an annual audited financial statement to the governor and the legisla-
ture.217  In addition, as detailed above, the statute subjected the board to certain 
state open meetings and open records requirements.218  Finally, the statute pre-
                                                            
207. Id. 
208. See W1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 0126/1. 
209. See WIS. STAT. § 232.03(2) (2016). 
210. See id. § 232.03(2)(a). 
211. See id. §§ 232.03(3), 232.03(5). 
212. See 1985 Wis. Act 26 (1985). 
213. See id. 
214. See id. § 1. 
215. See id.   
216. See id. § 232.05(1)(a)–(g).  In particular, the law encouraged the BCSEC to enter into con-
tracts with Wisconsin-based businesses and minority-owned businesses.  Id. § 232.05(2). 
217. See id. § 232.05(2)(e). 
218. See id. § 232.05(2)(f)–(g). 
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cluded the BCSEC’s ability to sell, exchange, or divest itself of the Bradley 
Center.219  In this regard, the dissolution provisions were carefully detailed, 
and if dissolution were to occur, all of the corporation’s remaining assets 
would go to the State—including the Bradley Center itself.220 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The story of the Bradley Center is notable on a number of levels.  The  
Bradley Center is the only sports facility used in any of the four major  
professional sports leagues that was not either built by a private owner as an 
investment or by a governmental entity to host a sports team.221  Instead, it was 
built by a philanthropist for the benefit of her community.  Mrs. Pettit’s unique 
distinction is even more impressive given that the Bradley Center cost her 
more than either of the other two arenas built for private investment that same 
year: The Palace of Auburn Hills cost $70 million, while Sleep Train Arena 
was $40 million.222  Indeed, as noted before, Mrs. Pettit approved the dramatic 
increase in cost of the Bradley Center from its original estimate because she 
wanted to ensure that the Milwaukee and Wisconsin communities had a state-
of-the-art sports and entertainment facility.223  This unprecedented and as-of-
yet  
unmatched approach to building a new sports facility provides a stark  
juxtaposition to the oft-criticized ninety-two other sports arenas and stadiums 
that were built—or are being built—with public financing and/or other public 
subsidies and favorable development approvals.  
In these regards, it is probably not too much to say that scholars have 
failed in omitting from the conversation Mrs. Pettit’s remarkable vision and 
approach to building a new sports and entertainment facility in a community.  
Maybe if other philanthropists knew more about Mrs. Pettit’s vision, they 
would have sought to emulate—or perhaps even outdo—her.  Indeed, this was 
one of Mrs. Pettit’s hopes: to inspire other philanthropists to share their wealth 
more  
robustly with their communities (for her, particularly those in Milwaukee for 
                                                            
219. See id. § 232.07. 
220. Id.; 1985 Wis. Act 26, LRB drafting file 1858-1, at 5. 
221. See Parlow, Equitable, supra note 5. 
222. See Johnny Lawrence, Detroit’s Suburban Palace in Auburn Hills, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 28, 
2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/385673-detroits-suburban-palace-in-auburn-hills; see also 
Sleep Train Arena Seating Chart, Pictures, Directions, and History, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/travel/stadium/_/s/nba/id/23/sleep-train-arena (last visited May 15, 2017). 
223. See Van de Kamp Nohl, supra note 2. 
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that particular community).224  But philanthropists are—largely—a bright,  
creative, and strategic group.  They certainly could have thought of something 
similar without reading about the Bradley Center.  Maybe their priorities were 
in other areas.  There are, no doubt, great needs in many communities and 
around the world—to take nothing away from Mrs. Pettit’s desire to give her 
community a new arena.  But we rarely see singular philanthropic gifts of this 
magnitude today that seek to enhance a community’s entertainment, sports, 
and cultural opportunities in the way Mrs. Pettit did.225  Instead, we see bil-
lionaires (who are far wealthier than Mrs. Pettit ever was) purchasing profes-
sional sports teams and then either pursuing a—or enjoying an existing—
sports arena or  
stadium that benefits from public financing.226  In this regard, today—and ever 
                                                            
224. See id. 
225. One example is Walter Annenberg, who—upon his death—donated art valued at $1 billion to 
the Metropolitan Art Museum in New York City.  See John Russell, Annenberg Picks Met for $1 Bil-
lion Gift, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/12/arts/annenberg-picks-
met-for-1-billion-gift.html (noting Annenberg’s announcing his intent to bequeath the artwork to the 
museum); The Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Walter H. and Leonore Annenberg Collection, VAN 
GOGH GALLERY, http://www.vangoghgallery.com/museum/United-States-of-
Ameri-
ca/The_Metropolitan_Museum_of_Art,_The_Walter_H._and_Leonore_Annenberg_Collection.html  
(explaining that the artwork was donated to the museum upon Annenberg’s death in 2002) (last visit-
ed May 15, 2017).  In today’s dollars, Mrs. Pettit’s gift of the Bradley Center would be more than 
$180 million.  See  
Consumer Price Index (Estimate) 1800-, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS, 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/teacher/calc/hist1800.cfm (last visited May 15, 
2017).  Herb Kohl—the former owner of the Milwaukee Bucks—is a notable exception.  He has 
pledged $100 million to a new sports arena in Milwaukee to replace the Bradley Center.  See Don 
Walker, Kohl Sells Bucks for $550 Million; $200 Million Pledged for New Arena, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/sports/bucks/milwaukee-bucks-sold-by-herb-
kohl-for-550-million-to-billionaire-investors-b99249475z1-255535471.html.  However, unlike Mrs. 
Pettit’s donation, this amount is likely to cover only 25-30% of the cost of a new arena.  See Rich 
Kirchen, Pending Bucks Sale Does Not Add Urgency ‘Cultural Assets’ Task Force: MMAC, 
MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2014/04/22/pending-bucks-sale-does-not-add-urgency-
for.html?page=all (noting that a new arena would likely cost between $400 and $500 million).   
226. Two recent examples are billionaires Marc Lasry and Wesley Edens purchasing the Milwau-
kee Bucks for $550 million and pursuing a new arena that will likely require some public financing, 
and Steve Balmer—one of the richest persons in the United States—attempting to buy the Los Ange-
les Clippers for $2 billion (the Clippers play in the Staples Center, which received some public fi-
nancing).  See Rich Kirchen, Lasry: Bucks Under ‘Huge Pressure’ to Build Arena; Will Need Public 
Funds, MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2014/06/23/lasry-bucks-under-huge-pressure-to-build-
arena.html?page=all; Ramona Shelburne & Darren Rovell, Los Angeles Clippers ‘Bid Book’ Shows 
Ballmer Overpaying, ESPN (July 23, 2014), http://espn.go.com/los-
angeles/nba/story/_/id/11253545/los-angeles-clippers-bid-book-shows-steve-ballmer-overpaying.  
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since her donation—we experience the opposite of Mrs. Pettit: Instead of us-
ing one’s wealth to provide a gift to the public without (much) cost to it, 
wealthy owners are using the public to increase their team’s profitability and 
value and, correspondingly, their own wealth.  The common explanation for 
this incidence is that public financing is what the market bears for new sports 
facilities.  And while this may be true, enough evidence suggests that Mrs. 
Pettit would not have cared what the market bore for a new arena for the Mil-
waukee and  
Wisconsin communities. 
So perhaps it is not just scholars and commentators who have failed in  
ignoring or forgetting—or at least keeping largely out of the conversation—
Mrs. Pettit’s extraordinary gift of the Bradley Center.  Maybe too few  
philanthropists—and certainly no wealthy sports team owners—have heeded 
Mrs. Pettit’s example and challenge in using their incredible wealth to better 
their communities in ambitious and robust ways.  In this regard, perhaps the 
donation of the Bradley Center is not the only aspect of this fascinating history 
that is unique and unlikely to be replicated ever again.  Maybe, too, we will 
never see another Jane Bradley Pettit again.  Here is to hoping that is not the 
case.  
